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When referring to environmental economics we often think of a new form 
of economics making a breakthrough in areas normally reserved to other 
fields of scientific thought, such as biology, chemistry, or even sociology. 
However, environmental economics is the simple (or complex) application 
of sorne instruments-- proved to be efficient in the economic analysis of 
various problems affecting humanity-- to a sphere hardly envisaged umil 
recentIy. J) , 
What is most oufst~aing about ~~n~~ics' as a method for analysing 
reality is its anthropocentric approach, meaning taking human beings, their 
needs and capacities as a reference point. In this way, a problem will only 
be analyzed insofar as it constitutes a problem for humans. 
~ .~ 
This explains why the people's view is the sole and exclusive criterion for 
determining the optimum situation. Of course, and here is where the 
difference líes in relationship with exact sciences, there are many people 
with man? dilf~rent needs that may come into conflicto This explains the 
need to define mechanisms which allp,w the allocation of available 
resources in a generally acceptable mannef:'" ()M , },) ,:J .. l.) ", 
1'¡V'>'JI,' 
Traditional neoclassic economics uses the market as a reference 
mechanism, which under very strict theoretical circumstances lea~o the 
efficient allocation of resources. This means that it is not possible to have 
¿ither an alternative allocation which generates greater production with the 
, resources available, or a better aggregate utility for consumers given the 
volume of available goods (Debreu, 1953). The generation of the maximum 
net profit implies that there is a greater potemial for allocation in society, 
independem of its later distribution. In a situation where markets function 
efficiently, the role of the public sector is restricted to supplying an 
adequate legal framework for preserving free competition, and for avoiding 
disturbances affecting the correct functioning of markets under perfect 
competition. ",1 
>t¡y-) 
This meChani~m! aS is well known, has been questioned from various 
perspectives ~ "Azqueta, 1996, in this publication). Firstly, because 
"market failures" exist, which means that a "natural" (automatic) tendency 
towards the optimum allocation does not spontaneously and easily appear 
in reality. Secondly, because by not taking into account income 
distribution, social ,e~fare criteria are not ineluded 
V~,.A. ~r~J""~-,,~ 
In this sense, environmental economics is specifically in chatge of 
analysing market failures. This is because, insofar as the market does not 
.'o.JNlfill its theoretical objectives, it will be necessary to analy7.e the reasons 
-;;rre~nting this and to design corrective instruments. Amo~~ the most 
! ,outstanding market failures for environmental economics, ex~ities may 
.).¡J--;¡V-w-
be pointed out on the one hand, and public goods on the other, as a 
particular case of the former. 
L EXTERNALITIES 
The problem of extemalities-- which can be simply described as the 
consequence of the activities of certain agents which affect the utility of 
other agents, without the latter having any decision-making capacity 
whatsoever or any compensation for possible damages (in the case of 
negative extemalities)-- is particularly relevant when analysing pollution. 
The fact that manufacturers using polluting productive processes do not 
compensate society in general, or agents in particular, for the damage 
caused by pollution, and consequently do not inelude this damage into their 
costs structure, implies that their levels of production following strict 
criteria for private income are higher than what would be socially desirable. 
The analysis of welfare economics about the problem of extemalities 
allows us to distinguish between the private optimum (which does not take 
into account extemal costs associated with extemalities) and the social 
optimum (which incorporates into costs structures "all" those which are 
relevant to society). The market does not efficiently allocate its resources 
not because its own theoretical perspective is wrong, but!because there are 
exterilalities, which are "market failures". Thus it will btf necessary to find 
./ 1,., 
instruments which allow us to correct these failures and reach the social 
optimum. tV)~oU. 
These instruments are based on two main theories, Pigou's and Coase's. 
Pigou worked on the basis that it was necessary to have a regulating agent 
able to perceive and value the existence of externalities and to force those 
liable to pay according to external cost (damage). This payrnent would take 
the form of a tax, which, unlike existing taxes, does not have the aim of a 
simple fiscal instrument. It is rather a corrective measure that penalizes the 
damage caused and solely to the extent of the damage. The payment of this 
tax will force the producer to reduce production, and consequently, 
pollution, and will also raise the price of the polluting good, thus reducing 
its demand (Pigou, 1920). 
Furthermore, it has subsequently been proven that Pigouvian taxes 
incentivate the introduction of less polluting technology (if it exceeds the 
cruciallevel). This is because, by lowering levels of pollution, the company 
wiIl paya lower tax, and costs after taxes will fall, thus compensating to 
sorne extent its investment in clean technology. 
The practical application of the Pigouvian tax has tumed out to be much 
more complex than what was foreseen in theory. Nevertheless, the idea of 
using the tax approach to control pollution still remains a topic of 
discussion (see San Juan, 1996, in this publication). In fact, at the present 
time, taxes are markedly the most applied economic instruments from 
amongst those designed by environmental economics, but are nearly always 
a complementary tool to other regulating measures (see Martín and 
Velazquez, 1996; Anton and De Bustos, 1996 in this publication). 
~ ;')t1'l1". 't)~. '.~ : '..J'" ~ 
Coase, on the other hand, developed his ~~ry on the basi%that negotiation 
between affected parties would lead to the attainment of the social 
optimum. The role of an environmental agency would be necessary to 
create a system allowing this, but would not be necessary to directly solve 
the problem. Coase particularly worked on the problem of property rights, 
pointing out that for the parties to reach a socially optimum agreement, it 
would be necessary for each and every good-- including environmental 
goods such as air, water or land-- to have perfectly allocated property 
rights. This way, the owners of these rights could exchange them for other 
rights, e.g. money, thus reaching a bargaining process agreement 
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satisfactory to aH. In other words, if the agents who bear the externality 
were to own property rights over air, the agents producing the externality 
could "purchasé" these rights from them, and thus poHute to a certain 
extent; and if the owners of the rights were the agents producing the 
externality, the agents bearing it would "purchase" these rights and 
maintain the air unpolluted. Coase proved that in both cases the same level 
of pollution was reached, which was the socially optimum level (Coase, 
1960). 
As in the Pigouvian case, the practical application of Coase's theory has 
revealed many limitations. Nevertheless, environmental economics has 
designed instruments which, to sorne extent, are based on the idea that 
negotiation between parties can permit the achievement of satisfactory 
agreements with non-interventionist pollution control policy (see Philp, 
1996 in this publication). \, 
Amongst these instruments, Transferable Emission Permits (TEPs) can be 
noted These grant their owners the right to issue a certain volume of 
pollution -- forcing them to control any additional amount-- which may be 
negotiable. In this case, TEP owners can seU their emission quotas, as long 
as they receive a price to compensate (or exceed) the costs of putting 
additional procedures of control into practice, in order to reduce their levels 
of emission to the volume allowed Likewise, agents who do not have a 
sufficient number of TEPs, can purchase more Permits if the price paid for 
them is lower than the costs of controlling emissions to their adequate 
level. The TEP market has proved to be a feasible economic instrument in 
environmental policy, but it is still not very widely used (pearce and 
Turner, 1990). 
The instruments used to reach certain levels of pollution are currently 
drawing the attention of ecooomists who are concerned by the outcome of 
sorne experiences in pollution control, revealing that the existence of a wish 
for intervention to improve levels of pollution is oot enough. It is well 
known that a one-rate tax or the regulation by law of environmental quality 
standards for certain productive systems which generate emissions in water 
or air, may, in sorne cases, turn out to be economically inefficient 
Furthermore, they do not always generate incentives for technical progress 
towards less polluting systems in the future. 
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Conceming the instruments based on propert:y rights. they have generated a 
zeal, which is sometimes excessive, amongst support:ers of liberal (non-
interventionist) standpoints for solving environmental problems. However, 
we must remember that despite the fact that they are an altemative to taxes 
(and in this sense they are instruments which protect citizens from the tax 
hunger of the modem State), they are actually another method of 
intervention. In fact, emission permits are nothing more than quotas which 
give a right lO a certain level of pollution, and it is thus necessary to 
organize a market which has quantity rationing and freedom for fixing 
prices. Moreover, experiences so far have revealed that the existence of a 
regulatory agency, which ensures market transparency and fixes technical 
standards or globally tolerable levels of pollution, is indispensable. 
11. ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS 
.;~~ 
Public goods are defined as those goods or services with a non-rival 
consumpti<1't1-- one agent's consumption of the good does not reduce its 
availability to anyone else-- and whicñ may not be excluded by pricing, 
meaning that it is difficult or impossible to deprive an agent of using it or 
forcing him to pay a price equivalent to the satisfaction he obtains 1. 
Public goods, as previously stated, are another of the most common market 
failures and are particularly important for the study of environmental 
economics. These goods have a joint offer and their consumption may not 
be excluded by pricing. 
:JJfr~r'''' 
Certain open spaces or landscapes, or the enjoyable con~mplation of 
certain species of animals ~d vegetation, have the feattÍres of public 
goods, and their managemfnt requires the solution of very complex 
problems. The main one is to know the value consumers give to these 
goods in relation to others. This information is required to make the right 
allocation of necessary resources to produce them, or, in this case, to 
protect them. 
In other words, if a value is given to the public good which is higher than 
the real one, more resources than necessary will be allocated This will 
I 1be extreme, or "polar", case of a "pure" public good has been defmed by Paul A. Sarnuelson as 
a good which is: 1) non rival in consumption, and 2) has \he characteristic of non-excludability, 
thal is, if the good is provided the producer is unabJe lo prevenl anyone consuming il. 
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logically affect the availability of financial resources for production-- or 
protection-- of other goods. A non-existent price and the lack of incentives-
- due to joint supply-- to indicate individual valuation, renders the market 
useless as an instrument for allocation. This makes it necessary to find 
altemative means for the environmental agency managing these goods to 
know the position they in fact occupy on the scale of social preferences, 
bearing in mind that society does not generally have incentives for a sincere 
response (Bolun, 1971). 
In any case, it must be stressed that valuations made by citizens or certain 
consumers need not reflect the ''total'' value. For instance, the leisure use of 
a certain naturallandscape (and its valuation) does not necessarily include 
the value it may have from a scientific, farming or agricultural point of 
view (see Azqueta, 1996, in this publication). 
m. V ALUA TION OF NA TVRAL RESOURCES 
The aboye becomes particularly complex when economics approaches the 
environment, an undefined collection of very specific resources-- natural 
resources-- and very abstract goods-- environmental resources-- the 
characteristics of which prevent a definition of the scope of the valuation 
made by individuals. 
Environmental goods, in the widest sense of the term, incorporate values 
which the market, insofar as it is studied by traditional economic theory, is 
not always able to assimilate into pricing or for which there is no market 
This explains the need for alternative methods which, without losing the 
theoretical importance supplied by the market in its purest form, may 
overcome its many limitationes. The values associated with environmental 
goods are of three kinds: use value, option value and value of existence. 
Use value may be direct- purely commercial-- or indirect-- associated with 
certain services the good provides. Only direct use value is always reflected 
in exchange value (price). Taking a tree as an example, the value of its cut 
wood or its collected fmit would be the case (Pearce, 1993). 
Indirect use value can be reflected in exchange value, although its 
incorporation depends on factors which are much more subjective. This 
makes it questionable from a stricter perspective. In the case of a tree, its 
indirect use value would be the shade it gives, its aesthetic value, etc., 
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which means it is .conditioned more by the circumstances of the individual 
making the valuation, than by the good itself. 
Nevertheless, even if we were able to design a very subtle market which 
can place a value on this type of service, some elements and characteristics 
valued by individual s would be excluded, especially in the case of 
environmental goods. The option value is granted to a good for the mere 
possibility of being the object of a direct or indirect use at some future 
momento In other words, it would be a deferred use value: the subject gives 
it a value insofar as the good offers some utility. 
However, this value cannot be assimilated to the market price- it is not 
reflected because it is not an object for present transaction. Likewise, the 
immanent value (value of existence), ~ value given to an environmental 
good for merely existing (its disappearance is valued as a loss) is totally 
subjective, and yet cannot be ignored when measuring the total value a 
certain good has for society. 
Neither must we forget that the existence of certain resources, such as 
animal or vegetation species, have a proven or provable scientific value. In 
this respect we may affinn that they should be valued as "future options", 
since they have a future exchange value. 
We shall have to, therefore, search for means which allow us to find 
approximations to the option value and value of existence. If we only use 
the infonnation supplied by the market, we may be giving certain goods a 
value lower than their true value, ando consequently, allowing an incorrect 
allocation of available resources. 
On the other hand, the option value and, aboye all, the value of existence, 
are so intangible as to make it very difficult for individuals to express them 
in a common parameter. Even if this were the case, these values may be 
manipulated- e.g. the value of existence given to a certain species of bird 
which lives on a remote island we shall never able to visit, and is therefore 
unknown, may be zero, until a publishing campaign presents it as an 
emblematic animal which stirs our emotions. 
Consequently, environmental economics should be concemed with creating 
adequate instruments so that this total value, effectively reflected, is not the 
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result of simple ideological behaviour lacking any foundation. In other 
words. if an individual says he greatly values whales, environmental 
economics will have to find the means of proving to what extent this is true 
and if helshe would be willing to give money to defend them. 
IV. MEmODS FOR V ALUATING CHANGES IN WELFARE 
The methods that have been developed to value changes in individual 
welfare are of two kinds: 
Firstly, those which take into account market restrictions for this type of 
resource and use markets related to them to indirectly estimate their price. 
Amongst these we have to point out the travel costs method and the 
hedonic prices approach, which use the behaviour of subjects in marlrets 
related to environmental goods, 80ch as the tourism market or the real 
estate market, to indirectly estimate its demand-- this would exclude the 
option value and the value of existence. 
Secondly, those which "create" the necessary theoretical conditions for 
subjecting the individual to market restrlctions and for forcing him to malre 
a pronouncement on the valuation he gives to environmental goods "as if" 
these goods were the object of market transaction- of relevance is the 
method of contingent valuation. 
These methods, with a relatively recent formulation- not more than fifteen 
years- have been applied aboye all to the valuation of natural spaces, and 
have proven to be particularly useful as instruments supporting 
environmental policy decisions, by trying to reflect the value society gives 
to these spaces as opposed to other alternative services the State supplies its 
citizens. Of course, they are questionable and controversial methods, but 
they represent a very important progress in the study of environmental 
problems (Freeman, 1993). 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF FUTURE GENERATIONS 
Lastly, another element that environmental economics has given great 
attention to is the temporal importance of decisions affecting environmental 
goods. The fact that future generations may suffer the consequences of 
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current decisions, forces us to take their opinion into account. Since future 
generations cannot participate in the current market, it will be necessary to 
somehow incorporate their interests. The method used by envirorimental 
economics for solving this problem is the intertemporal discount rate, of 
which the definition is not problem-free. The fact of updating the interests 
of future generations in a "discounted" way, Le. giving them less 
importance than the interests of present generations, makes many groups 
uncomfortable. On the other hand, if future interests were valued in the 
same way as current ones, it would be necessary to reach the infinite ("all" 
future generations) and to design these future interests-- a rash exercise, 
since these do not have to coincide with current interests. It is obvious that 
intergenerational solidarity must be present in all decisions, especially 
those concemed with environmental policy which affect the natural 
heritage of Mankind But it is also necessary, to the same extent, to carry 
out intragenerational solidarity, i.e. to grant the present generation the right 
to define its interests, although these may be an aberration from an 
environmental point of view, e.g. felling a forest of unique value to sell its 
wood for food (see Johnson, 1996 in this publication). 
Future generations must be particularly taken into account when studying 
the management of natural resources. When resources are not renewable, it 
is necessary to manage a total stock in an efficient manner, which means 
administering it in such a way that all generations-- present and future--
may share its scarcity to the same extent. This has led to the formulation of 
rules for the price behaviour of these resources-- particularly the Hotelling 
Rule (Hotelling, 1931 )-- the objective of which is to make the extinction of 
the resource coincide with the moment its price is high enough for its 
demand to be equal to zero. In other words, the price will slowly increase in 
such a way as to reflect the progressive increase in the resource and the cost 
this entails for future generations, and thus the demand will gradually 
decrease. In this way, the extinction of the resource will oot occur 
suddenly, but will instead be a sufficiently long process as to give rise to 
the appearance of substituting products with competitive prices. In short, it 
is a matter of administering what is scarce, throughout time, bearing in 
mind that this "time" should inelude all generations. 
The efficient management of renewable resources-- animals and plants--
fmm an economical point of view, is the management of a flow, 
administered in such a way that it does not ron out. In this case, the 
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environmentaI problem to be avoided is the extinction of species: contrary 
to the case of non-renewable resources, this extinction is in faet avoidable. 
EnvironmentaI economics establishes behavioural rules for the 
management of renewable resources, which allow one to determine the 
optimum level of exploitation from an economical point of view (Krutilla 
and Fisher, 1985). 
When the interests of future generations are introduced, environmental 
economics faces ethical problems and, as opposed to the sciences 
mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, it cannot appeal to the 
objective coldness of biology or chemistry, nor to the moral criteria which 
feed sociology. Environmental economics, therefore, has the challenge of 
applying and developing its analytical instruments to problems which, 
though not new, may seem to be so. Environmental economics is 
sometimes accused of being commercial, when in fact it is attempting to 
place the theoretical instrument known as the market-- and not the social 
and ideological system, as many may think-- at the service of new interests 
and concerns. A new form of economics has appeared in contrast to 
environmental economics, known as "ecological economics", which 
attempts a much more global approach to environmental problems, 
studying the systems as a whole of which economic relationships are only 
part of the general ecological framework. Ecological economics has 
provided a very important contribution to the study of environmental 
problems. However, it is still a philosophical approach which is particularly 
interesting because of its aspirations, but which is also very limited from a 
practical point of view (Christensen, 1989). 
Environmental economics, possibly with a more limited perspective, uses 
instruments which are already proved and enables a predominantly 
practical approaeh to environmental problems. 'Ibis provides support, both 
fundamental and as an essential complement, where other regulating 
instruments may be unsuccessful: to consider human behaviour as a 
collection of continuous decisions, often contradictory, in which we may 
take part-- for better or for worse (a value judgment which in principIe is 
not a matter for the economist as such)-- by using the mechanisms the 
individual is familiar with, Le. prices or incentives whichforce or help him 
to administer a limited budget for covering needs which may be unlimited 
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As Pearce and Tumer (1990) have already pointed out, environmental 
economics tends to be more holistic than conventional economics, by 
attempting a wider view of how economics works. Because it Is more 
holistic there is the temptation to think that environmental economics is 
somehow "beUer" than traditional economics, which has led sorne to regard 
environmental economics as an "alternative" form of economies, as 
something which is to sorne extent in competition with the main body of 
economics doctrine. This is the wrong approach. Rather than searching for 
a differem economic theory we are trying to widen the horizons of 
economic thougbt. 
The development of theoretical perspectives, as a consequence of an 
economic approach to the environment, affects the basic concepts upon 
which economic theory itself has been built. In particular, there are two 
fields of economic thought which are undergoing profound changes and 
which are particularly interesting. 
Firstly, accounting normalizations, ando National Accounts in particular, 
which face the challenge of altering "macromagnitudes so that they may 
reflect, together with exchange values, other contributing values to a 
country's wealth or decay. Thus, the so-called Natural Accounts have 
appeared, which, though stilI in a preliminary phase, are making very 
valuable contributions with clear political consequences. 
Secondly, traditional models of growth and development are also 
developing at the same rate as new concepts in environmemal economics. 
This has given rise to alternative models such as Sustainable Development 
(see Redclift, 1996, in this publication), associated with the problem of 
globality and intergenerational solidarity. These new models are on the 
dividing line between that which is purely sciemific and ethical, making 
their practical consolidation difficult and encouraging manipulation; but, at 
the same time, they allow an approach to intemational reality and to the 
distribution of powers between countries. This wilI doubtless be a topie of 
deeper analysis in the next decades (see Montalvo, 1996, in this 
publication). 
Therefore, a very odd transformation process in economic thougbt is taking 
place, arising from the approach to environmental phenomena" and 
gradually extending to a global economie vision of the reality of mankind 
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VL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
APPLIED ECONOMICS 
For the editors of this publication, environmental economics means the use 
of instruments supplied by economic theory for solving environmenta1 
problems. 
Therefore, what is at issue here is a vision of applied economics aimed at 
the efficient solution of environmental problems in European economies. 
By using the terms "efficient solution" we wish to stress that the common 
approach of the contributions published is to propose means of achieving a 
technical objective (usually a standard of environmental quality) and an 
economic objective (usually the achievement of this "technical" objective 
by minimizing the resources used and by maximizing social welfare). 
An efficient solution is therefore not the achievement of environmental 
objectives by using more resources than necessary, at our present level of 
knowledge, nor at the expense of losing private or social welfare benefits 
which could be saved by using more adequate instruments. 
In order to distinguish between different levels of success, in programmes 
for achieving objectives or specific environmental standards, we shall refer 
to technical effectiveness-- when the environmenta1 objective is reached--
and to economic effectiveness when available resources are used in the 
most productive manner to reach these goals. 
In some cases there are no alternative techniques, but just a possibility of 
using economic resources to reach the environmental objective. In this case 
the economic problem and our role as economists are of linle importance. 
In any case, our role would consisto for example, in proposing alternatives 
to encourage a process for technological innovation allowing the choice of 
technology which is economically more efficient. 
In other cases, the range of "technical" options is very wide. This usually 
means that there are possibilities for making a choice amongst various 
environmenta1 technologies, while affecting production choice s (production 
techniques), the amount of output, and the consumption of input s per unit 
of output produced. Furthermore, these alternatives may entail a significant 
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variation in levels of employment and income amongst the citizens of a 
region. 
In these cases, "various techniques" not only means different engineering 
solutions but also different fonns of management or economic 
organization. Therefore, altematives exist for fulfilling the ensemble of 
objectives proposed. These entail a simultaneous attainment of the best 
''technical'' and "economic" solution, thus maximizing social welfare(see 
Beers, 1996, in this publication). 
VII. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND NA TURAL RESOURC~ 
TIte efficiency of various instruments for attaining environmental quality 
objectives should be valued from a two-fold economic point of view: 
1) Instrumental technical effectiveness for attaining the environmental 
quality objective proposed by the environmental agency. 
2) Paretian economic efficiency in the action programme, understood as the 
best possible allocation of resources used for attaining the environmental 
objective proposed. 
Market instruments for controlling pollution levels appear in economic 
literature as a result of affinning that unifonn regulation Oegislation)- both 
for levels and productive technologies- is inefficient as a means of 
achieving a reduction in pollution until it reaches the target desired. This 
conclusion was first obtained by Baumol and Oates (1971; 1988) by 
pointing out that the marginal cost of pollution control, or marginal 
abatement cost, is always different between various polluting companies. 
H the objective the environmental agency wishes to control is ~fined in 
tenns of a certain pollution level, e.g. water quality, another source of 
significant inefficiency- due to the different economic value of 
environmental impacts caused by discharges- also arises: the so-called 
marginal damage costs. 
H the marginal abatement cost and/or marginal damage costs differ 
according to various sources of emission, then efficiency (defined as the 
achievement of the objective at minimum resource cost) requires a flexible 
control. The greater part of controls are defined in tenns of low marginal 
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abatement cost and high marginal damage cost for the sources of emission 
(polluting companies). 
The market instruments operate by fixing a price for pollution, and 
subsequently letting companies fix their levels of emission according to (in 
the simplest case) their equivalent marginal damage costs, thereby adapting 
their method of marginal abatement cost to the price fixed for pollution. 
If the price is unique, the result is equal to the marginal abatement costs of 
all polluters-- this is a necessary condition for efficiency. 
If marginal damage costs vary within a tax system following the "polluters 
pay" principIe, like the one proposed in Europe, the tax rate should differ 
between companies according to their marginal damage costs. In a 
perfectly differentiated tax system polluting companies minimize costs and 
will act in such a way that, on balance, the marginal cost of reducing 
pollution (as opposed to reducing emissions) is equal in all polluting 
companies. Once again, the result of the model's simplest form is 
efficiency. 
However, from various experiences in developing a tax system for 
controlling pollution, based on the original model proposed by Baumol and 
Oates, three kinds of problems arise: 
1) Great levels of information on the marginal abatement costs of 
company pollution are required in order ro fix correct differentiated 
(efficient) tax rates. Furthermore, the "correct" type may vary with 
time when the aggregate function of the marginal abatement cost 
changes to current prices. When marginal damage costs change, the 
EPA should point out how they are distributed amongst companies: 
a one-rate tax in these circumstances could be very costly in terms 
of resources used, perhaps even more costly than a single quality 
standard. 
2) A simple tax system, where funds obtained from taxes are not used 
to finance environmental measures. may minimize social costs, but 
may be very expensive for companies in terms of distributing the 
impact amongst themselves. This could lead them to press for the 
use of fixed quality standards for all, instead of taxes. 
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3) As long as the environmental agency has no "correct" tax rate and 
companies minimize their costs, the desired pollution level is not 
reached. . 
Tradable discharge permits allow us to overcome these problems under 
certain conditions (see Hanley, 1993). For example, if they are 
grandfathered, the transfer of funds to the environmental agency (included 
in the tax system with no compensation) is then eliminated, and the agency 
need not know aH the functions of marginal abatement cost for polluting 
companies. In this way, discharge permits become a quantitative restriction 
with a fixed price in the discharge permits market. Therefore, if companies 
do not act fraudulentIy and the agency is right in its calculations, the levels 
of poHution foreseen are achieved 
However, if marginal damage costs vary, as usually happens in many cases 
of environmental quality control of water, exchanges of discharge permits 
are carried out, at the price (exchange rate) of one for one in the total area 
controHed. leading to violations of prograrnmed quality levels. 
In practice, it is complicated to solve this problem with a system of 
environmental rights. We need to fix working rules for the market of 
tradable discharge permits which reduce the number of cost-saving 
transactions and mean that the TDP system does not exactIy reach a 
mínimum cost solution. And. lastly, discharge permits markets may face 
problems of imperfect competition in their agents' behaviour, especially 
when the number of potential agents is reduced (few companies with 
TDPs). Although this implies that the cost of attaining the objectives 
íncreases, the majority of available studies (Maloney and Yale, 1984) point 
out that this effect is relatively weak. 
In practice, TDP markets are expected to efficientIy allocate multi~attribute 
assets. In other words, the "discharge permit" ineludes attributes such as 
water quantity (river flow), reliability and timing, since users demand water 
for different uses and periods, and therefore have a different willingness-to-
pay for the resource (see Howe, 1996, in this publication). But even when 
we consider one use alone, such as irrigation which in Spain represented 
80% of water quantity demand, problems arise as to how to ratíon the 
resource amongst irrigators (see Garrido, 1996, in this publication). . 
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VID. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
Most of the papers in this publication are dedicated to this type of problem. 
In other words, we are presenting a selection of papers whlch show the 
progress that has been recentIy made by environmental economics, in 
solving the environmental problems of European economies. 
The range of environmental problems is very wide. The growth of existing 
problems has increased in the last few years, together with society's 
concem for these problems. 
The European Union has developed a specific environmental policy, based 
on the cross-border nature of pollution and the potential danger of 
processes for global environmental change on a world scale which seem to 
require supranational solutions. 
The fact that environmental policy in the EU was developed before most 
norms in member countries, and the pressure of green or environmental 
groups in the European Parliament, have favoured the development of a 
specifically European environmental policy. 
However, one could affirm that environmental measures in Europe are 
more recent, and in many cases are a legacy of U.S.A. or Scandinavian 
experiences. 
IX. THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLlCY 
The origin of European environmental policy is the Paris Summit of 1972, 
where a supranational environmental policy was adopted for the first time 
with the slogan "pollution has no borders". However, the First Programme 
for Environmental Measures had great difficulty in obtaining the necessary 
funds for its fulfilment, since the economic crisis triggered by the rise in oil 
prices in 1973, led European governments to adopt drastic measures for 
budgetary cuts. 
Once the first reaction to the economic recession was over, environmental 
policy, until then a mere statement, was reacti vated 
In 1977, the Second Programme for Environmental Measures was adopted 
At first, the environmental measures proposed had the aim of contributing 
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to reduce the most acute pollution problems by means of corrective 
measures. 
Consequently, these measures focused on enablíng the introduction of 
corrective techniques at the point source. 
To a large extent, the prograrnmes were directed at financing or subsidizing 
the introduction of end-of-pipe technology. 
Since a significant part of these problems was present in large industrial 
installations and urban concentrations, the prograrnmes were "technically" 
successful (objectives of air or water quality standards were reached). They 
were also a polítical success for the EU, given the great visibility of results. 
However, in most cases, there is no approach which allows us to evaluate 
the economic efficiency of intervention. The technology used is usually 
presented as the sole alternative, and there is only discussion as to how to 
cover the necessary expenses of investment and the later upkeep of 
installations. 
The main problem with this approach is that it cannot guarantee that the 
environmental objective has been covered without using more financial 
resources than necessary. Therefore, given that the funds are in fact limited, 
there is no guarantee that more projects could have been undertaken with 
an efficíent use of the same resources. 
The idea of the EU as a financial source for solving environmental 
problems has made European environmental policy both popular and 
strong. 
As environmental policy has become more popular, a great number of 
environmental problems needed to be sol ved. Apart from point sources of 
pollution, diffuse sources appeared, Le. pollution produced by consumer 
goods, mobile sources (transportation) or chemical inputs. 
In 1983, the Third European Prograrnme for Environmental Measures tried 
to introduce the concept of pollution prevention at its source. Therefore, a 
move is made from impulsing palliative technology to non-polhiting 
technology, which in practice is only less polluting. 
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From an economic point of view, this opens a field for developing 
environmental economic instruments, which is quite important for 
economic incentives which try to impulse a change towards pollution-
saving techniques. 
By using prevention at the source, we can discuss which preventive 
measures are most efficient from an economic point of view. 
Furthermore, this approach leads us to the conclusion that environmental 
objectives should be taken into account when elaborating other economic 
policies. 
This viewpoint is reflected in the Directive of July 3, 1983, which 
integrates environmental objectives in all sectors, particularly agriculture, 
the oil industry, transportation and tourism. Later, in 1992, the Single 
European Act, which amends the Treaty of Rome, reinforces the obligation 
to include environmental aspects in supranational European policies. 
Amongst other important consequences, this has forced al1 projects 
financed by European funds to include environmental impact valuations. 
The Fourth Environmental Programme of the Community (1987-1992) 
includes two essential features which imply a change of direction in 
Community policy on environmental protection: in the first place, the 
principie that a Community environmental policy should be developed at 
the heart of other Community policies, and, secondly, the 
acknowledgement that environmental protection policy may contribute to 
increasing economic growth and job creation. 
Environmental Community Measures (ACE) propose four objectives: 
I.-Developing clean technology. 
I1.-Implanting techniques for recycling and reusing materials. 
I1I.-Locating and restoring areas polluted by residues and dangerous 
substances. 
IV.-Elaborating methods for controlling environmental quality. 
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TIte novelties introduced are the civil responsibility of the pollutant and the 
prevention of pollution at its source. 
However, from an economic point of view, the main problem with this 
technical and scientific approach towards the measures is the non-
contemplation of the economic efficiency by the programmes. In fact, the 
programmes only contemplate economic aspects from the point of view of 
quantifying the necessary subsidies for introducing corrective measures 
(e.g. in heavy oils and traditional power stations). 
TIte Flfth Programme for Environmental Action, with the motto "towards 
sustainable development", reinforces the idea of an equilibrium between 
natural resources and economic activity. 
Along these lines, "sustainable" development or, to be more precise, 
development sustained by the natural environment, is characterised by: 
• Maintaining the quality of life. 
• Permitting continuous access to natural resources. 
• Preventing more damages to the natural environment. 
Amongst the objectives, there is a new emphasis on: 
A.-Focusing on the agents and activities which harm the 
environment and use up natural resources. 
B.-Preventing instead of remedying. 
C.-Inducing changes in behavioural and consumption habits. 
The European Environmental Agency may play an important role in 
consolidating this process, and it has begun to evaluate the results of the 
Fifth Environmental Action Programme. 
One of the first results clearly revealed in the evaluation of the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme is that the lack of statistical data 
prevents us from carrying out an anaIysis of the economic efficiency of a 
large part of the environmental prograrnmes of the EU. 
As a result, the report (European Environmental Agency, 1995) tries to 
determine the possibilities of attaining the "technical" objectives 
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(environmental quality standards proposed as an objective in the Fifth 
Environmental Action Prograrnme). 
However, it does not even approaeh a discussion on the economic 
efficiency of these measures. It is clear that, in order to enable this 
approach, it is necessary to make a greater effort in the realm of statistics. 
In particular, it seems essential to try and avoid physical data (which often 
contain the main economic statistics) being lost in the aggregation process 
or only being gathered in the first years of the series. 
In other cases, statistics require a total methodological revision and a new 
reelaboration. This seems more difficult to carry out, particularly since 
Eurostat should oversee that the historical series of the main magnitudes 
are not damaged 
The problem becomes even more complicated when we take into aecount 
that the objectives, laid down for a EU of only twelve members, are 
currently being applied to futeen. This entails many problems of 
aggregation, evaluation and homogenization of methodologies. 
As regareis the objectives proposed at an aggregated level, we must also 
point out that environmental problems (excluding problems of climate 
change andIor global scale) have a very different effect on each country, or 
even on a certain region within each country. In these cases, it seems very 
possible that the objective may be reached at a EU global level, but that 
serious problems will remain at a locallevel. 
In this respect, we could question whether the objective of noise level not 
exceeding 65dB (stabilizing in 1990 the level existing in 1980) is in faet 
being aehieved. since it is not difficult to find a lot of housing bearing 
higher noise levels due to air or vehicle traffic. Furthermore, the measures 
for improving this situation are neither cheap nor easy to carry out. 
This would lead us to question if defining problems at such an aggregated 
level is the most suitable way of solving them. It seems reasonable that 
problems should be first arranged by order of priority, and that we should 
analyze the social profitability of taking on the various prograrnmes in 
order to establish their priority. 
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Even while recognising that final decisions for facing and financing 
problems will be political, this should not ignore the need for seriously 
anaIysing altematives in terms of economic efficiency. Without this 
anaIysis, environmental policy becomes a series of technical and 
environmental obligations which hope to gather enough support to cover 
the necessary expenses of the programme. The U.S.A. experience is that 
this type of approach often deteriorates into a squandering of resources and 
a growth in environmental bureaucracy (see Viladrich, 1996, in this 
publication). 
Therefore, it is necessary to state that "command and control" programmes 
(direct management by an environmental agency) are not the only 
alternative. Other instruments, such as markets for tradable discharge 
permits or taxes on added pollution, may have a wide scope of application 
according to the particular type of environmental problem. This need for 
awareness of the possibilities offered by other instruments is partly the 
reason for the publication of this book. 
At present, European environment8I policy needs to improve its 
quantitative knowledge of existing problems (by reforming statistics), in 
order for evaluations to reflect the levels of economic efficiency attained by 
policies. 
Secondly, it is necessary to specify which is the relationship between the 
wide liS!: of problems- included under the title "environment"- and the 
resources used for solving them. 
The problems European economies frequently face are very similar to this 
type of complex reality, of which an approximation can only be found in 
introductory texts to environmental economics: models or policies. Here we 
are focusing on real problems which, in case studies, intend to show how 
practical problems can be approached from an environmental economics 
perspective- learning by doing, while trying to maintain the strictness and 
clarity of the instruments studied Only a few selected problems are 
presented, to avoid falling into a range of problems which is too large, thus 
avoiding the superficiality which is unfortunately so abundant in the 
treatment of many of these problems (see Alba, 1996; Petrella,1996; Saez, 
1996 about employment and the enviromental; Decimavilla, 1996; Garrido, 
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1~; Howe, 1996; Naredo, 1996; S umpsi , 1996 about water 
Management.) 
Some problems are not considered at aH, but we prefer to wait until 
adequate studies exist, of which the economic perspective may be used as a 
model. Fortunately, texts such as those of Turner ed., 1993, already exist, 
which present interesting case studies. Furthermore, progress in the 
environmental application of economic instrUtnents is currentIy quite rapid 
On the other band, the evaluation of the Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme highlights that some environmental objectives are being 
reached and others may reach the standards laid down for the year 2000. In 
this respect. we can mention: 
A. On a global scale: 
1. C02 emissions (with some reservations, we could reach the 
objective of 102% of the 1985 volume by the year 2000). 
2. Reducing CFC emissions to zero. 
B. On a European scale: 
1. Objectives related to traffic (NOx emissions and noise leve!). 
2. Conserving the abstraction of marine and underground waters 
(particularly pesticide pollution), but the objective of reducing 
nitrate in ground water to zero seems unattainable. 
3. Freezing C02 emissions after the year 2000. 
4. Managing urban solid waste, where a large part of public and 
prívate investments have been focuses. However, the evaluation of 
the FIfth Environmental Action Programme points out that the 
objective of stabilising rubbish from inhabitants at the 1985 level in 
the year 2000 will not be fulfilled 
6. Improving the discharge of residual waters. Here too important 
investments are being carried out, which will possibly have an effect 
in the medium term on the improvement of the quality of continental 
and coastal waters. However, poHution due to the use of pesticides is 
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a problem with no probabilities of being solved in the medium tenn, 
and is thus a matter of concern. 
Amongst the environmental quality objectives, which will not be reached 
unless new and more efficient prograrnmes are executed, we can point out: 
TIte stagnation in the volume of C02 emissions after the year 
2000. 
Pollution problems due to traffic (noise, NOx emissions). 
Management of chemical emissions. 
Environmental management of coastal areas, and 
Solving erosion and deforestation problems. 
x. FINAL COMMENTS 
TIte magnitude and width of European environmental problems, as well as 
the volume of resources already being used to reduce them (estimated at 63 
bn ECU in 1992 for the EU12), require a perspective of the prograrnmes' 
economic efficiency. Environmental economics is developing and 
perfecting tools for contributing to solve environmental problems, taking 
into account social welfare and the restrictions of available resources. 
We hope the papers included in this publication will assist in providing 
environmental solutions, without losing sight of essential economic 
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